Everyone building this
Everyone is solving agent identity. They all leave the same piece open.
Each effort answers who is this agent? in its own world. None runs the one thing they all assume: a neutral place to check whether an agent is still trusted.
Internet standardsIETF agent identity, on WIMSE
Short-lived tokens, and requests signed with them.
No revocation. In the draft's own words, “a short expiration is the primary mitigation.”
Signature agentsWeb Bot Auth
An operator's keys, published in a directory at its own site.
No revocation. A withdrawn key keeps verifying until the verifier fetches the directory again.
Identity platformsCommercial products
Identities for the agents inside one company's systems.
No neutral check. Trusted wherever that vendor is trusted, and nowhere else.
Policy frameworksKnow-your-agent rules
Who made the agent, who answers for it, what it may do.
Revocation named, not built. They require it and specify no mechanism.
AINRABeneath all of them
One passport any of them can check offline, from a root no vendor runs.
Revocation anyone can check. Revoke once, and every copy is refused, within 30 seconds on the strict setting.
AINRA plugs in beneath them, not instead of them: a running copy can present as a standard IETF workload or sign beside a signature agent. Same request, two verifiers. After revocation, the standard alone keeps accepting; AINRA refuses. Run it yourself: make wimse-e2e · make signature-agent-e2e. Of 130 efforts we counted, the number of non-profits operating cross-vendor verification and revocation is zero. The list, with sources.